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THE BIG SMILE

An Analysis of the Soviet 'New Look'

(Chicago Tribune)

By MATTHEW WOLL and JAY LOVESTONE

Published by
Free Trade Union Committee, American Federation of Labor
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1. HOW OLD IS THE 'NEW LOOK'?

By MATTHEW WOLL

Matthew Woll is first vice president, American Federation of Labor, and chairman of the A.F. of L. Free Trade Union Committee.

THERE IS nothing fundamentally new about the Kremlin's resorting to good manners when its interests demand tactics of affability and politeness. Some 20 years ago, the Kremlin accorded the present British Prime Minister on a visit to Moscow such royal treatment that some British labor spokesmen were painfully bewildered by the commissars acting so suddenly like bourgeois gentlemen. Thus, Fenner Brockway, now a Laborite member of the House of Commons, wrote about Eden's reception at Moscow in early 1935:

> "Mr. Eden was welcomed as though he were in a capitalist country rather than in a workers' state. The Workers' State which has overthrown Monarchy, Capitalism, and Imperialism, flaunted the symbols of Monarchy, Capitalism, and Imperialism on every hand. Union Jacks were displayed at every turn; Mr. Eden heard the strains of the National Anthem wherever he went. If this violation of the whole spirit of Soviet Russia really impressed Eden, it can only have been because he felt that *it signified a modification of the Russian attitude.*" (NEW LEADER, London, April 5, 1935.) (Emphasis ours.)

Royal Reception a Ruse

This royal reception by a Communist dictatorship to a representative of British royalty was inspired and ordered by Stalin, at a time when Khrushchev was of no significance in Soviet politics. Then the democratic world also hailed Stalin's tactical shift in his diplomacy from rudeness to politeness as a "modification of the Russian attitude."

Apparently, Khrushchev is an apt pupil of Stalin and has learned much from this most ruthless of all dictators on how to apply the appropriate tactics for advancing the interests of the Soviet dictatorship. Apparently, Eden was then taken in quite a bit by the 1935 edition of the Soviet smiling strategy. Clearly,

Brockway, as a "class" opponent of Eden, was also impressed—but quite naturally in reverse, that is unfavorably.

Yes, and apparently, too many of our statesmen of 1955—20 years after this experience with Stalin's pleasant performance—have yet to learn that, in the interest of Communism, Soviet rulers will use any means. They can turn smiles and sweetness on and off like we turn on and off a faucet in Washington or a tap in London.

The important question here is not *who* does it, *but how it is done, and when and why is it done* one way at one time and another way at another time. Let us see when and why the Kremlin dictatorship resorts to a softer line, to less rude or more gentle tactics. For an answer to this question, we turn to the sessions of the Enlarged Executive Committee of the Comintern (C.I.) held in February-March 1922. Then, the Kremlin was so eager for "normal and peaceful relations" and even alliances with capitalist states, with governments it had previously abused and denounced as "war-mongers" and "imperialist beasts," that important leaders, especially in French and Italian Communist ranks, began to take these Muscovite moves very seriously. They became alarmed at the prospects of the Kremlin selling them down the river to the "reformists" in France and Italy.

Meaning of Moscow's Maneuver

To wipe out this false notion and unwarranted fear in Communist circles about the real meaning of the Kremlin maneuver, the Russian rulers of the Comintern mobilized their then heaviest artillery, Trotsky and Zinoviev. In his capacity as the then head of the Communist International, Zinoviev thus explained the why and the wherefore of the first edition of the Soviet "new look":

> "If, for example, the Red Army of Soviet Russia had taken Warsaw in 1920, the tactics of the C.I. today would be quite different. This, however, did not happen. The Russian party was forced to make greater economic concessions to the peasants and partly to the bourgeoisie. This decreased the tempo of the proletarian revolution, and vice versa; the defeats suffered by the proletariat of Western Europe during 1919 and 1921 influenced the policies of the first proletarian state and slowed down the tempo in Russia. It is a two-fold process."

The above strategy was applied because of the ebbing of the tide of Communist revolutionary advance after World War I, or what the Communists then called "the period of temporary and partial stabilization of capitalism." The present, 1955, edition of

the "peaceful" or "co-existentialist" Soviet strategy is similarly rooted in the Kremlin's realization that its post-World War II assault on Western democracy has been brought to a halt. We need but cite Greece, Berlin blockade, Korea, defeats in French, Italian and German labor ranks, expulsion of Communist organizations from CIO, breakup of WFTU. In 1955, Moscow realizes that it again needs time, a respite in which to consolidate and tighten its grip on the loot it grabbed in Europe and Asia.

It realizes that free European economy, despite the senseless Potsdam agreement to split Germany, has not only been reconstructed but has greatly exceeded the pre-war levels. Into a cocked hat have been knocked all the cherished dogmas of the Kremlin about a shattering economic crisis inevitably gripping the United States after the close of World War II. Nor is Moscow unaware of the fact that the increased unity and strength of the free world have reached a high point of atomic and aviation deterrence to Soviet aggression.

From Genoa to Geneva

When Communist Russia faced a similar situation back in 1922, its then Foreign Minister Tchicherin, carrying out the policy laid down by Lenin, head of the then "collective leadership," told the Genoa Conference:

> "The Russian delegation recognizes that, *in the present historical period, which permits a parallel co-existence of the old social order and the new one being born, economic collaboration between the powers representing the two systems of property is urgently necessary for general economic reconstruction.* . . . The Russian delegation has come here not to make propaganda for its theoretical views, but to set up practical relations with the governments." (our emphasis)

Is this Geneva in 1955? No, this was Moscow's policy at Genoa in 1922! There the Soviet's first "new look" came forward with a veritable program for so-called capitalist construction! These are the links in the chain of Bolshevik "co-existence" strategy—from Lenin to Stalin to Khrushchev. In fact, as an individual, Tchicherin was a polished gentleman whose diplomatic smiles and skill were the envy of many a statesman in striped pants. No matter how hard Khrushchev and Molotov should try, in the period of the present Soviet "new look," they will never be able to attain the heights of polish and affability mastered by Tchicherin, who had an entirely different background and training than his successors.

Well, it might be said that the Western statesmen are no fools.

They won't be taken in by mere Soviet smiles. And they will sign no pacts unless these contain clear-cut, firm pledges against Soviet subversion and aggression. Of course, the Western statesmen are no fools. They are highly skilled in the art of diplomacy meticulously developed through centuries of advancing civilization. And, of course, the Kremlin under Khrushchev will be at least as ready to give pledges—just as precise and to the point as the Kremlin under Lenin and Stalin did. In fact, Lenin was so anxious for a respite, in which to consolidate what he had seized, that on May 7, 1920, the Soviet government went so far as even to conclude a treaty of peace with Georgia. This treaty provided:

> "There shall henceforth not be tolerated any military operations . . . on the territory of Georgia . . . or capable of transforming the territory of Georgia into a base of operations directed against the R.S.F.S.R. or against its allies, or against the public order therein established. . . .
>
> "Russia undertakes not to permit on its territory the sojourn and activity of all groups and organizations pretending to the role of government of Georgia or of any of its parts, as well as of all groups and organizations which have as their object the overthrow of the government of Georgia."

Ruthless Violation of Treaties

Here was a reciprocal, a two-way, pledge. But what happened to it? On February 11, 1921, about nine months after this treaty was solemnly signed and Georgian independence assured, the Soviet Red Army, under Stalin's orders, invaded Georgia and snuffed out its national freedom. Three days later, on February 14, the Moscow Politburo approved this fait accompli. Leon Trotsky, then Commissar of War, explains it all:

> "Menshevik Georgia could not hold out. That was clear to all of us. However, there was no unanimity as to the movement and methods of Sovietization. I stood for a certain preparatory period of work inside Georgia, in order to develop the uprising and later come to its aid. . . .
>
> "The military intervention passed quite successfully and did not provoke any international complications, if one does not take into account the frantic campaign of the bourgeoisie and the Second International. . . ."
>
> (From STALIN, by Leon Trotsky, p. 268)

The same tactics were pursued in 1920 by the "collective leadership" under Lenin in the treaty with Latvia (*now also part of the Soviet Union*) and in the pact with Poland (*a very large*

"THE RED HAND OF FRIENDSHIP"



Seaman in Justice (ILGWU)

part of which has since been annexed outright by Russia and the remainder of which has become a Soviet puppet). Article IV, Section 2 of the Treaty with Latvia, August 11, 1920, reads:

> "The two contracting parties undertake not to permit the formation or residence in their territory of organizations or groups of any kind claiming to represent the government of all or part of the territory of the other contracting party, or of representatives or officials of organizations or groups having as their object the overthrow of the government of the other contracting party."

And Article II of the Treaty with Poland, adopted October 11, 1920, stresses:

> "Each . . . is entering not to form or lend support to organizations having as their object the promotion of armed action against the other contracting party, the abolition of its political or social regime."

Indeed, no more precise and explicit pledge could be asked for or given. But what followed? In time, the world witnessed the

butchery of Poland through the Stalin-Hitler Pact of 1939. After a few years came the Lublin formula of getting all Poles around one table—for a short while. There swiftly followed the imprisonment, exiling and execution of the democratic leaders with the consequent destruction of the national freedom and human rights of the Polish people.

Who can forget the Communist murder of Alter and Ehrlich? The destruction of the democratic labor and peasant movements and the shipment of many thousands of Polish trade unionists, peasants and intellectuals to the slave labor camps of Russia's bleak Arctic are now history. But it is history which can teach us much. Tomorrow, *as yesterday and before yesterday,* the Kremlin will rigidly and hypocritically reaffirm its ironclad "declarations regarding the non-responsibility of the government for acts of the Communist International." Precisely on the basis of this fraudulent distinction, the Soviet government, "pursuing its peace policy," pledged on June 4, 1923, in its treaty with Britain:

> "Not to support with funds or in any other form, persons or bodies, or agencies, or institutions whose aim is to spread discontent, or to foment rebellion in any part of the British Empire, and to impress upon its officers and officials the full and continuous observance of these conditions."

Philosophy of Communist Duplicity

What has happened since the above precise pledge was made? The infamous atom spy Fuchs and the impotent political hack, Pollitt, Communist Party boss in Britain, could tell—but won't. The fate of the Litvinoff pledges to President Roosevelt, on the occasion of American recognition of the USSR, is too well known to require comment. The philosophy of this Communist duplicity was thus clearly expounded by Lenin in his "Letter to American Workers" on August 20, 1918:

> "He is no socialist who does not realize that, in the interest of the victory over the bourgeoisie, in the transferring of power to the workers, in the interest of the international proletarian revolution which is commencing, one must not and should not stop short at any sacrifices, even the sacrifice of territory or the sacrifice of severe defeats at the hands of imperialism. . . .
>
> "There are agreements and agreements; there are *fagots et fagots,* as the French say. . . ."

Obviously, the situation facing Moscow in 1955 is quite different from what it was in 1918. *We are not drawing mechanical parallels, but are merely pointing to lessons to be learned from*

experience with Bolshevism in its theory and practice. Today, the Soviet government does not think of territorial concessions. Krushchev, Bulganin and Molotov have truculently refused even to discuss "in the spirit of Geneva" the problem of the captive nations, even to listen to any proposals for lessening international tension by lessening in the least the Kremlin stranglehold on the peoples whose territory it stole and whose national and human freedom it destroyed.

Today, no one in his right mind can say that the Soviet government faces any threat of aggression or problem of security. Unlike in 1918, when the Soviet regime was still very weak, Moscow negotiates today from positions of great strength. Communist negotiators do not even have to smile nowadays, unless it aids them in confusing and dividing the democratic camp.

Resort to Various Tricks

Of course, in their negotiations tactics, in the pursuit of their "peace policy," the Moscow rulers will resort to all kinds of maneuvers and tricks. The Kremlin diplomats will seek to palm off these maneuvers as concessions to the Western powers. For instance, no one should be surprised if Moscow should arrange to have Peiping agree to sit around a conference table with representatives of the Republic of China. No doubt, many in the democratic world would hail such a maneuver as "a great concession by Moscow," as the most significant confirmation that the "new look" has something really new in it for the furtherance of peace. "Experts on China," whose expertness is in no small measure responsible for the rise of the Mao Tse-tung dictatorship, would, of course, enthusiastically welcome such a move as proof of open cleavage between Moscow and Peiping and as a reason for American recognition of the foreign-imposed Peiping regime and its admission into the United Nations.

Actually, such a maneuver by the Kremlin would have nothing new in it. The Kremlin resorted to such strategy when it could afford to do so much less than it can today. Back in 1919, Lenin accepted the invitation tendered by President Woodrow Wilson and others to the Soviet government to attend a conference at Prinkipo, at which "the various Russian factions could iron out their differences and come to an agreement with the Allies." Today, Mao Tse-tung is far stronger in the Chinese civil war than Lenin was in the Russian Civil War in February 1919. Consequently, the Peiping dictatorship, backed solidly, generously, and continuously by the now powerful Soviet Empire, would certainly risk less and

very likely, therefore, be even more eager than was Lenin to confer with his civil war opponents.

In citing the above favorable response by Lenin to Wilson, we do not mean to prophesy that Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung will repeat—blindly and mechanically—the same course. We merely point to it in order to indicate a not improbable similar Moscow "peace" maneuver in the Far East. Here we have further light on and additional confirmation of the continuity of Soviet strategy and tactics: flexibility and variety of manners, maneuvers and means for the purpose of advancing the constant, permanent and unchanged ultimate and fundamental aim of the Kremlin: the development of maximum Soviet power in order to hasten the day of Communist world domination and enslavement.

Kremlin Opposes Free Elections

This explains why the Kremlin has not made any move to abolish the Iron Curtain against the Russian and captive peoples. This explains why Moscow has so stubbornly and rigidly opposed free elections under UN supervision as a means of eliminating tension in any area of dispute or division—whether it be Korea, Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, or the Baltics. Here is the key to "the Russian problem," to the Soviet "new look," to the continued peril of Communist subversion and Soviet aggression against the peace, freedom, and well-being of the entire world.

The "New Look" regime in the Kremlin has not kept even the few and rather limited promises it made, right after Stalin's death, to soften a wee bit some of the dreadful features of the Soviet criminal code and the utterly inhuman anti-labor laws of of the Soviet "paradise." Even for its own people, the Russian dictatorship has not stopped its war against peace and freedom. Momentarily, the Kremlin dictatorship has found it advisable (and even necessary) to place more emphasis on waging this war against democracy and decent international relations with weapons other than military. The methods and weapons on which the stronger emphasis is now placed are different from those employed in Korea in 1950, in the Berlin blockade, or even by Vyshinsky in the UN. But Moscow's aim is the same and the free world continues to be the Soviet target.

Particularly in the atomic age are total wars—world-wide civil wars—fought by the Communists with different weapons, means and tactics at different times. The Communists have never limited themselves to the use of military arms in their drive for world conquest and domination. Neither did Hitler. The Communists

have always relied on a combination and variety of weapons—depending on the time, the place, their own position, and the conditions at hand. So did Hitler.

In this light, it is clear that the Kremlin is today just as much on the offensive as it ever was for the promotion of its fundamental aim. In fact, this Moscow offensive waged today primarily with weapons of stealth and deceit, wrapped in smiles and camouflaged by good manners, is even more dangerous to the free world whose leaders as well as whose people earnestly want peace and freedom and are ready to give and do much for this great cause.

But peace, as well as freedom, is the very antithesis of totalitarian Communism, which was born out of a war and out of the destruction of democracy. Totalitarian Communism lives on fomenting and waging civil and other wars. It has never come to power in Russia or anywhere else except through war and terrorism. It is preparing for world conquest and enslavement through the subversion of the remaining free lands and their ultimate conquest by force of arms.

To prevent such a final clash of arms, or world war, or even so-called local wars, without hurting the cause of peace or sacrificing freedom must be the overriding aim of democratic diplomacy in all its negotiations with Moscow. To the Kremlin, diplomacy, like all other means, always has been only an instrument of attack against the democracies, a means of weakening their world position. To the free world statesmen and negotiators, diplomacy must continue to be only another *and important* instrument for protecting peace and promoting freedom, for welding greater democratic unity and strength as the best guarantors of international harmony, human liberty, and well-being.

Bolshevik Words and Deeds

We have examined the Bolsheviks' words and deeds of yesterday. We have placed their words of today in their proper historical perspective. We have compared their more recent polite words with their persistent practices. We do not rule out the theoretical possibility that the Bolsheviks can make changes. They have made changes in the past. And they will in the future. But what we do propose is that they give some genuine substance to their surface smiles. We propose that they replace their old dogmas with new and different deeds.

We should be very happy to work with any one for the lessening and elimination of international tension, for the advancement of the national freedom and well-being of all peoples re-

gardless of race, color, or creed, and for the creation of a firm foundation for enduring and endurable world peace. Only then will the world have not armed or precarious "co-existence" but lasting genuine international harmony. It is in this spirit that the freedom-loving peaceful world and particularly the free trade union movement of the United States and other democratic lands hopes for the day—and is prepared to do everything in its power to hasten this day—when the Soviet regime will be ready to consider earnestly and pursue sincerely and energetically the following policies in the interest of furthering world peace and freedom:

(1) Genuine gradual disarmament enforced and assured by a system of adequate international inspection and supervision, not subject to veto, and by President Eisenhower's proposal for exchanging blueprints of all military installations and mutual aerial reconnaissance.

(2) Cooperate to establish the national re-unification of Germany in freedom through free elections, with all parties having the right to participate, under UN supervision. Such democratic elections to choose a representative national assembly which shall establish an All-German Government that shall be completely sovereign in its domestic and foreign relations.

End to Subversion

(3) The holding of free elections, under UN supervision, in all areas of dispute and division, in Asia as well as Europe, in the Baltic and Balkan captive lands, with a view of restoring their national freedom and human rights.

(4) The genuine and complete dismantlement of the world-wide subversive Communist machinery and the total cessation of all its covert and overt efforts to subvert the free world and its democratic institutions.

(5) Positive steps to enable the Russian people to be free—and without fear of punishment—to establish contacts and communications with the peoples of the non-Communist countries.

Here are deeds of a type that the peaceful nations are hoping for and counting on as giving real life to polite words and great promises. Here is a positive and constructive approach towards assuring all humanity the peace and freedom it so richly deserves.

2. WHAT IS NEW IN THE 'NEW LOOK'?

By JAY LOVESTONE

Jay Lovestone is executive secretary of the A.F. of L. Free Trade Union Committee and director of the International Labor Relations Department of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union.

SO MANY words which have so little to do with reality! This is the common and outstanding feature of many articles now rolling off our presses about the new type of government that has arisen in the USSR since Stalin's body passed out of the Soviet scene.

In the main, these analyses center on petty superficialities. These analysts put palaver on a par with principle. They equate boudoir piffle with the principles of Bolshevik seizure and extension of power—the theory and practice of which have been enunciated and applied over half a century in all parts of the world.

The New York Times Pulitzer Prize expert on Russia recently gave the essence of this new thinking about the Soviet's "new look" when he stressed that Russian rule has now fallen "into the hands of a party-going, party-loving collective." To show how human and peaceful is the "new look" of the Kremlin, Mr. Salisbury points out that at a recent top-level outing—sort of picnic at the summit—Premier Bulganin invited "the three Bohlens into his limousine to see the deer. At the deer park, Premier Bulganin gave a whistle and his animals came running."

Disciplined Deer

How wonderful! How disciplined are the Communist deer! The zoo keepers, and particularly the hunters, of the capitalist world would be well advised to rush a delegation to Moscow to learn from Bulganin and Khrushchev how they get these peace-loving animals to answer so "collectively" and swiftly the call of the party line. In the spirit of Geneva, Khrushchev and Bulganin would surely and gladly share this secret of co-existence between various types of animal life.

Our Pulitzer Prize winner proceeds in overly scholarly fashion to tell us:

" 'Kollektivnost' as a method of rule is not as new as it

seems in its Russian spelling. What is new, really, is its application to the Soviet system. Stripped to its essentials, it means rule by a small committee—a board of directors, if you will. Or a 'junta,' if you prefer the vocabulary of the South American revolution."

In using the terms "board of directors" and "junta," this expert gives his analysis a sort of all-American touch to fortify the soundness of his evaluation in the minds of the policy-makers of North and Latin America. But if ever comparisons were malodorous and treacherous to truth, they are in this instance.

Here the analogy drawn is between a totalitarian dictatorship and a private business corporation in democratic America or non-party rule by a military clique in some Latin-American republics. It is folly to compare conditions and institutions which have nothing in common with each other. To draw a political balance sheet in this manner is just as unsound as adding Bulganins, plus Bohlens, plus deer, plus whistles at this newly-hallowed picnic ground.

Erroneous Analyses

Five serious errors are common to the spate of this type of analysis of the present state of affairs in the Soviet Union. These are:

(1) *An attempt to explain and evaluate the latest developments in totalitarian Russia by judging them on the basis of the same standards as we do events and experiences in the non-totalitarian countries*—especially in countries like the U.S. and Britain, which have strong democratic institutions and vital democratic ideals tested and invigorated by many decades of struggle. The surest road to false conclusions is to employ the yardsticks and standards of value in the democratic way of life to conditions, institutions, problems and prospects in the totalitarian dictatorship.

An example of this is to be found in the notion that the Soviet dictatorship is in danger of collapse and will, therefore, make real concessions to the free nations. It is true that if a government in Britain, France, the U.S. or the German Federal Republic were responsible for one-fiftieth of the disastrous economic mistakes and the costly political stupidities of which the Kremlin hierarchy has been guilty, it would be driven out of office by the voters. In 1954, it took only about three million unemployed, alongside about 60 million gainfully employed, for even so popular a figure as Eisenhower to lose control of Congress. However, in totalitarian Russia, where the people are denied all democratic rights and are completely defenseless politically and otherwise, no matter what the regime does, it gets over 99.95 percent of the votes cast.

(2) *Drawing hasty and sweeping generalizations that are based on temporary and superficial phenomena.* Examples of this are to be found in the conclusion drawn, with such indecent haste, that Moscow is now peace-loving and ready to make amends and concessions in the interest of peace because Khrushchev did not scowl but smiled "at the summit" and Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan went out boating and raspberry-picking with Mrs. Charles E. Bohlen, wife of the U.S. Ambassador.

These experts can rest assured that the entire Communist presidium would be happy to go out rowing and raspberry-picking with the wives of all our ambassadors on both sides of the Iron Curtain, if our government would only let the American people be "taken for a ride" in China—by voting, in reciprocal appreciation, for the admission of Mao Tse-tung into the United Nations.

(3) *Overlooking the fact that, regardless of the chance of conference-table manners and petty pleasantries, the Kremlin continues to rule Russia through the most rigid and ruthless totalitarian dictatorship which has ever besmirched the pages of human history.* These experts somehow keep studious silence or reveal total blindness in regard to the absolute continuation of the one-party system throughout the Soviet domain, no matter what personal demotion or liquidation may occur at any level of the ruling clique.

Monolithic One-Party Monopoly

Thus, these experts, not comprehending the full meaning of a monolithic one-party government monopoly in a totalitarian dictatorship (provided for in the Soviet Constitution), tend to attach too much significance to particular incidents in Soviet politics and economics. We need but recall how the liquidation of Beria who, for his own factional reasons, toyed momentarily with limited liberalization measures, was misinterpreted. The very manner of Beria's trial and the speed with which he was executed brutally demonstrated the absolute continuity of the totalitarian system with all its evils at their worst. Yet, the end of Beria was hailed by our highly prized and high-priced experts as proof that a new day of freedom has at last dawned in Russia!

Another instance of the nonsensical conclusions to which failure to see the full significance of the continued one-party Communist dictatorship leads is to be found in the evaluation made by these experts of the fall of Malenkov. These analysts attached much to Malenkov being plump and genial and possessed of a chin dripping with weakness! These experts hastened to tell us

that he got the gate because he represented the "peace party" in the Kremlin.

In all sincerity, and with as much panic, they told us that the rise of the "tough" Khrushchev in place of the "soft" Malenkov meant the triumph of the "war party" in the Kremlin hierarchy and the beginning of a much rougher and tougher Soviet foreign policy. But what actually followed? Khrushchev, in the saddle, "apologized" in Belgrade and smothered the democratic statesmen at Geneva with smiles. No one can rightly maintain that President Eisenhower was the only one to sire the much-vaunted holy "spirit of Geneva." Khrushchev and Company shared in its conception and creation.

(4) *None of these experts whose conclusions make so much of Moscow's "new look" ever utter a word to point out the sinister significance of the fact that, in all its good-mannered diplomatic exercises, the Kremlin sternly rejects every allusion or hint, let alone move, in regard to its giving up even a single square foot of territory it has, in the last decade, brought under its yoke through Communist subversion and military force.* So thrilled are these erperts with Moscow's "new look," that they systematically overlook the Soviet insistence on holding captive the Balkan, Baltic and central European peoples. So blinded are these experts by Khrushchev's "new look," that they fail to see the peril to world peace and freedom in Moscow's invigorated drive to hold captive the 18 million Germans in the Soviet Zone in order to use the pitiful Communist puppet regime as the means for gradually swallowing all Germany, the way Poland was swallowed, in Lublin "coalition" fashion.

Remove Causes of Tension

These experts have revealed an almost neurotic ecstasy over Bulganin's lack of bad manners at "the summit"; but they have not shown the slightest sign of being disturbed or even concerned over the continued tense and acute Soviet-orbit state of preparedness for instant aggression as demonstrated after Geneva by the barbarous air attack on an unarmed commercial Israeli plane which accidentally strayed a few miles into Bulgarian territory. They are so excited and overjoyed by the post-summit "decline of world tension" that they do not deem it necessary or find the time to apply their analytical and interpretive abilities to the meaning of the North Korean puppets shooting down an unarmed observation-training plane over the neutral zone.

The first thing to do about lessening international tension is to remove its causes. Paying tribute to, or being overwhelmed by,

Khrushchev's smiles and apologies, Bulganin's neatly trimmed beard, and Zhukov's military medals, manners and memories will not reduce international tension. The only relaxation that such exercises in self-deception will provide is the relaxation of the democracies' efforts to build and maintain sufficient defensive strength to deter and, if need be, defeat aggression.

The Bolsheviks have built the Iron Curtain—first of all against their own people. We are not proposing that the democracies should batter down the Iron Curtain by force of arms or war. We are proposing that those who built the Iron Curtain should themselves break it down—if they really want world peace and freedom. Certainly the democracies should do nothing to encourage or strengthen the determination of Moscow's ruling circles to maintain the Iron Curtain as an internationally accepted part of the world status quo.

Worldwide Fifth Column

Our experts on Russian affairs are rendering a distinct disservice to the cause of lessening tension, protecting world peace, and promoting human freedom when, in their appreciation of the Soviet "new look," they overlook the over-riding importance of Moscow's unchanged policy—its determination to hold entire nations in captivity.

(5) *Very seldom, and inadequately at that, do most of the experts on Russian affairs point out that, "new look" or not, the Kremlin continues to adhere fanatically and faithfully to the "proletarian dictatorship" and its basic, ultimate aim of world domination.* Under the "new look"—just as much as in the days of Stalin's old look—the Kremlin continues to finance, operate and control a world-wide Communist apparatus, a fifth column, with which to subvert all non-Communist countries and thus facilitate and hasten their coming under the Moscow yoke.

The Khrushchev-Tito Pact of Belgrade is often cited as proof that the "new look" means a great deal. Therefore, those enchanted by the "new look" would do well to give some serious thought to the July 16, 1955 *Pravda* article dealing with the "development of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia." Its entire tone is hostile to Western democracies. *Pravda* underscores that all differences on the road to the achievement of "Socialism" must be kept within the framework of the "proletarian dictatorship." There certainly is nothing new—by hook, crook, or look—in this Moscow stricture. Moreover, *Pravda*, seeking to emphasize that the new relationship between Belgrade and the Soviet bloc is going to influence greatly the domestic

situation and trend in Yugoslavia and that the *Khrushchev-Tito embracement is only the beginning,* frankly stated:

> "The pursuit of Socialist foreign and internal policies, the extension and strengthening of political and economic ties and cooperation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and the countries of Peoples Democracy, *have important significance for the further development of Yugoslavia* along the road of Socialist construction. . . .
>
> "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union considers it desirable to establish contacts and *rapprochement* between the CPSU and the Union of Communists in Yugoslavia. Now the *first results* have been achieved and the *first pre-conditions* created for the establishment of such contact and rapprochement." (our emphasis)

Obviously, the "new look" which is supposed to have so much newness in its policy towards Tito is not so new in either content or intent—insofar as Moscow sees it.

It is the failure, or the refusal, to see the full implication of this inherent feature of the "new look" that explains much of the wishful thinking by these and other experts about the relations between Moscow and Peiping and the continued identity of *long range,* as well as short-range, interests between these Communist dictatorships. The Moscow-Peiping Axis was conceived in subversion and aggression. Despite all the Kremlin's "new looks," this Axis continues to be dedicated to Communist subversion and aggression.

Many Heads Rolled

No doubt, there is no single individual today who has the *authority* that Lenin once had throughout the Soviet empire and the Communist world. No doubt there is no one in the present Kremlin ruling circle who already has *the power* that Stalin once wielded in the Soviet orbit and the international Communist conspiracy. It took years of internecine factional strife (and many heads to roll) before Stalin could take the place of Lenin. It will undoubtedly take some years before there will emerge a successor to Stalin in the Soviet dictatorship. The post-Stalin struggle over succession will not necessarily be identical in every detail with the post-Lenin developments. History repeats itself—*essentially but not exactly,* principally but not precisely.

There is much talk today about Moscow's "collective leadership." This is not a new idea, new institution, new system or even "a new device," as some prize-winning correspondents are trying

so hard to make us believe. As far back as March 31, 1920, when there was far less terrorism in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union than there is today, Lenin told the Ninth Congress of the CPSU that *"A bloc is always needed between the Party groups that are in the right. This should always be an essential requisite for a correct policy."*

There was at least as much talk in Russia and throughout the Communist world about collective leadership after Lenin died as there is today in the USSR and the U.S. In 1924 and in the years following, everybody hailed the "collective leadership"—which in time gave birth to the monstrous party dictatorship of Stalin. But today, as then, one institution remains unshakeable, one system continues unchanged and unchangeable. That is, the continuation of absolute and total monopoly of all power by one monolithic (Communist) party at the helm of a dictatorship which is far more totalitarian than the Fascist, Nazi, Falangist, Peronist or Salazar brand.

Struggle Over Succession

How quickly some tend, or like, to forget! The struggle over succession to Stalin has now been going on for only about two and one-half years, or 30 months. It has not yet reached the massive bloodletting stage of the purges which Stalin organized some 13 years or 156 months after Lenin died. But why forget that within one week after Stalin died, Malenkov, who then held the top post in the party secretariat of the Communist Party and was also Soviet Premier, was ordered to give up his key party post? His demotion did not stop there, as shown by his subsequent removal as Soviet Premier.

The fact that Malenkov has not yet been liquidated is being hailed by some ambassadors in and experts on Moscow as inspiring proof of the profound significance and humaneness of the "new look." Well, well! It is sometimes hard to draw a hard and fast line between ignorance, forgetfulness, and just sheer intellectual laziness. When the Stalin "collective leadership" removed Rykov from the Soviet Premiership, its Fuehrer, in equally humane and insignificant fashion, assigned Rykov to a post very similar to the one Khrushchev has now so generously given to Malenkov. From being titular head of Soviet electric power to being made totally powerless and then electrocuted or liquidated was not such a long road for Rykov to travel. How long it will take Malenkov to traverse this course, or whether he will trace exactly the same course, is of no real import. *It is the continuation of the system*

for dealing with both Rykov and Malenkov that is the constant and decisive factor here.

Beria was primarily responsible for the first reduction of Malenkov's powers during the period when the latter was still a first-class condidate for succession to Stalin. Beria did this with the full support of the entire 1953 "collective" leadership of the monolithic party of totalitarianism. This clipping of Malenkov's powers helped Beria considerably en route to his goal of taking Stalin's place. But, within a few months, this same "collective leadership" turned on Beria. The process of deadly elimination in the struggle over succession to Stalin is far from over. Who will be next? Not even the experts can tell us.

In this connection it is interesting to note that Khrushchev does not rely only on smiling, cheek-pinching and raspberry-picking in order to advance himself on the road to succeeding Stalin. The "new lookers" might be interested in the fact that Tovarish Khrushchev, in his devotion to "the new system of government" in the USSR, has been seeking vigorously—just as Stalin did—to extend and tighten his control of the party *against all other members of his "cocktail-loving" committee* who might also be aspiring to become "first among equals."

Khrushchev's Cronies

Thus, at the recent full meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU (July 4-12, 1955), Khrushchev saw to it that his Ukrainian stooge A. D. Kirichenko should be elected to the presidium of the party; that the ardent supporter of his "virgin soil" campaign, N. J. Belayev, and his henchman editor of *Pravda* and collaborator in Peiping (also more recently in Cairo) D. T. Shepilov, should be placed in the all-powerful secretariat. Tovarish M. A. Suslov was also added to the presidium and A. B. Aristov to the secretariat. Whether the last two named are already full-time members of the inner circle of the Khrushchev clique is not yet known to us. At any rate, of the five thus advanced, at least three are cronies of the chief smiler, Khrushchev.

Incidentally, for those who place so much faith and hope in the smiles of Khrushchev, it is of no small importance that these latest additions to the party leadership represent *the party bureaucracy, the party apparatus,* and not the technical, administrative and military groups that are supposed to constitute the social basis for the "new look" and its so-called peace policy. This shows that the struggle over succession to Stalin goes on and that, at this moment, Khrushchev is first in the running and has the upper hand. He is still "more equal" than the other "equal" members

"BACK OF THE BAR"

Seaman in Justice (ILGWU)

of the "committee" with the "new look" today in charge of the Kremlin.

But even if Khrushchev should finally succeed in taking Stalin's place, he will be able to do so not because he apologized to Tito, pinched the cheeks of an American security officer on guard in the halls of Geneva's Palace of Nations, or grinned at Eisenhower at the "summit." If Khrushchev does not skid the way Malenkov did or get shot like Beria, it will be only because he will manage to utilize, in the worst Stalinist manner and tradition, the much ballyhooed instrument of "collective leadership" for the purpose of expanding and consolidating his power. Such an expansion and consolidation of Khrushchev's power will have as little newness in its appearance and humaneness in its substance as did the extension and monopolization of power by Stalin.

In this connection the experts, no less than the ordinary normal mortals, would be well-advised to think seriously about the following remarks made by one of the participants in the aforementioned

"new look" post-Geneva picnic outside Moscow. He was quoted by Mr. Salisbury as saying:

> "These men run Russia, the world's second power. After all, they are the survivors of the toughest political school in the world. They were Stalin's right hand men for years—and they survived him. It took plenty to come through these years." (Reported by Harrison E. Salisbury, New York Times Magazine, August 21, 1955.)

Indeed, these men are creatures of Stalin. They were conceived in his darkest terrorist days. They were reared in the filing cabinets of his card-index system listing victims—his comrades and collaborators to be murdered, his political friends and acquaintances to disappear in the Vorkutas and Kolymas. Only people with suicidal tendencies can see Kremlin interest in establishing honorable relations with the democratic nations as the force behind the rather belated good manners of the Communist "committee" men at the helm of the Soviet Empire.

'Tactics Change Many Times . . .'

What the "new look" means to the Soviet rulers was made clear by the leading theoretical organ of Khrushchev's party, The Communist, published in Moscow. In its January 1955 issue, there appears an article entitled: "The Strategy and Tactics of Leninism." Its author, N. Tropkin, writes:

> "The tactics of the revolutionary proletariat are manifested in the concrete forms and means of the fight to attain strategic objects. Since the social-political situation is subject to sudden changes, frequent changes in the forms and methods of revolutionary activity are inevitable. During the course of each strategic stage, tactics may be changed many times. . . .
>
> "Nobody can deny that Communism is the most powerful and unconquerable social movement of the present day. It will conquer the world of exploitation, lawlessness, and oppression. The frantic efforts of the bourgeoisie, which is doomed to inevitable destruction, to reverse the wheel of history and to delay the growth of the forces of Communism are vain."

This is the new in the "new look," as seen by Khrushchev's principal Communist Party policy organ and thinkers. We of the free world—whom Moscow's masterminds still consider as "the world of exploitation, lawlessness, and oppression"—would be well rewarded to see the "new look" as the "new lookers" themselves see it—in its all flexible strategy and rigid purpose.

For the people of the Soviet Union, just as for the peoples

of the rest of the world, the "new look" has not meant the lifting of the Iron Curtain, the slightest weakening of the totalitarian dictatorship and its one-party monopoly system. It has not meant the slightest move in the direction of restoring the democratic rights which the Lenin dictatorship destroyed. It has not meant the faintest indication that the present Kremlin ruling clique is prepared to free even one square foot of the soil Stalin looted and stole from the peoples today firmly under the iron heel of Soviet military power and political despotism. The Kremlin with its "new look" has yet to make a single substantial move in the direction of eliminating the cause of world tension and for joining with other nations in building a peaceful world in freedom.

It is true that, after ten years of opposition, Moscow finally joined the democratic powers in granting Austria a state treaty. But this is no more a Soviet concession than was the Kremlin's giving up its war to subject Greece to Communist slavery, Stalin's discontinuing his blockade of Berlin, and the Moscow-Peiping Axis momentarily ceasing its drive to destroy the national independence of all of Korea and to foist totalitarian Communism on the entire Korean people.

No Soviet Concessions

In all of these situations—before as well as after Stalin's death, before as well as after the "new look" came into the world picture—the forces of Soviet subversion and aggression made no concessions in the interest of peace and freedom, but were actually compelled to retreat in the face of overwhelming opposition by the people to Communism and the increasing unity and strength of the democratic powers.

Yet there is something which seems to be new about the fundamental situation in the Soviet Union and its totalitarian dictatorship. What looks like *new,* is the way in which the wishful-thinking experts have been looking at the continuing, persistent, and inherent basic characteristics and fundamental aims of the Soviet regime, its rule at home and its role abroad. This is the nearest thing to *new* in the "new look" about Russia. Indeed, when the unchanged and unchangeable black of yesterday is proclaimed the white of today, that is something new to the politically purblind. Here is a change. *But the change is not in the object looked at. The only change is in the subject looking at it.* When the unchanged and unchangeable red in the Communist world aims of yesterday is seen as the gray—if not yet the sepulchral white of today—that is something new—a new illusion. But here we have

only an illusion of the onlooker and no actual change in the reality of the object looked on.

Yet, even this illusion is not so new, for it is a return to and a repetition of the mistakes made, for instance, in the days of Ambassador Joseph P. Davies and his "Mission to Moscow"—a volume which became the bible of those who willingly or unwittingly fostered policies of submission to Moscow. We must add, however, that in the atomic-hydrogen age, with the vastly expanded military might of Communism in Europe and Asia, the mistakes inherent in the "new look" are even more dangerous to peace and freedom than were the illusions about "reformed Communism in the service of peace" in the days of the Popular Front in the middle Thirties and the notions about a democratized, peaceful Soviet Union at Yalta.

Appearances Deceiving

Appearances are deceiving everywhere—especially in totalitarian Russia. Here political deception has been enormously developed as an art and science of government at home and imperialist power politics abroad.

In drawing this line of distinction, in pointing out exactly what and where is the seemingly *new in the "new look"* about Russia, we are not trying to minimize the importance of this recurrent false notion in aggravated forms. In fact, the illusion of the "new look" is of extremely sinister significance for the peace and progress of the world and the freedom and well-being of the entire human race. How important it is, and in what direction the world will be moving in the next years, will be answered, in large measure, by the policies the Foreign Ministers of America, Britain and France will pursue and promote in their post-"summit" negotiations.

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